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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION FROM FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS REPORT CD NO. 50X1-HUM

COUNTRY

USSR

DATE OF INFORMATION

1950 - 1951

SUBJECT

Economic; Technological - Glass machinery

PUBLISHED Daily newspaper

Feb 1951 DATE DIST.

WHERE

PUBLISHED Moscow

NO. OF PAGES

PUBLISHED 7 Dec 1950

SUPPLEMENT TO

LANGUAGE Russian REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

Moskovskaya Pravda,

SOVIET PRODUCTION PROBLEMS AIRED AS MACHINE PLANTS FACE HEAVIER SCHEDULES

S. Gurov

The Moscow Steklomashina Plant is a small enterprise which is of great importance to the national economy. It is the only plant in the USSR specializing in the production of complex machines for the glass industry. Its output is in great demand by enterprises which produce construction materials, foodstuffs, chemicals, electric bulbs, instruments, and other items.

Before the war, the plant had developed more than 50 types of machines. During the first 4 years of the postwar Five-Year Plan, it put out many highly productive machines. But this year its plan is not being fulfilled, output is late, and economic indexes have sharply decreased.

For three quarters of 1950 the plant has failed to fulfill its plan for reducing the costs of production by 3.6 percent, and labor productivity was 5 percent lower than planned. For 10 months of 1950, the plan for commercial output was met only three times, -- in April, August, and September. In the other months it failed by 30-44 percent. Only 79 percent of the entire 10-month plan in commercial output was fulfilled.

The chief cause of this situation is the failure of the management to organize the work of production properly. The shops work haphazardly, without proper apparatus and controls, and without checking blueprints.

The complex OM-12 machine, for example, was to be put out in November. However, the machine shop did not receive the blueprints until 5 November or the technological documentation until 11 November, 2 months later than they were needed. The directors were not prepared to settle, in good time, new and more complicated problems.

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A singular feature of the plant program this year is the fact that about 70 percent of the various types of output are new machines, never produced anywhere by anyone. It is clear that the Design Bureau and the Department of the Chief Technologist at the plant, which must perform work of great volume and complexity, should have been strengthened. The management did not do this. It did not even fill out these departments with the number of workers provided for in the official schedule of past years. If the Design Bureau lacks six of the 25 authorized workers, and the technology department has only two or three experienced men, this small staff of workers cannot be expected to do all the designing and preparation for the production of 37 new items per year.

The workers of the Main Administration of Textile and Light-Machine Building of the Ministry of Machine and Instrument Building are responsible along with the directors of the Steklomashina Plant. The main administration has seen the plant working feverishly for about 10 months, but has done nothing to correct the situation.

Another reason for the poor showing of the plant was the fact that the main administration acted bureaucratically in settling such a serious matter as organizing the cooperation of Steklomashina with other enterprises for the production of a large number of parts which could not be made on the spot.

It is true that the main administration and the ministry distributed Steklomashina's orders to other enterprises, but they did nothing to guarantee the completion of the cooperative orders within the specified times. A number of important parts either did not arrive at Steklomashina at all, or they arrived greatly behind schedule. The Kiev Bol'shevik Plant held up the production of sprocket wheels, gears, and other heavy steel parts for 5 months. Shafts and gears, which should have come from Uralkhimmash (Ural Chemical-Machine Building Plant) in March, have still not arrived.

Fulfillment of the cooperative plan is similarly affected by the fact that a number of machines have waited months for completion, and uncompleted production at the plant, according to data of 1 October, was 36 percent above the norm. This production cannot be converted into ready output overnight.

In 1951, the plant faces fulfillment of a still larger and more complex program. Above all is the question of filling plant technical positions with a sufficient number of skilled workers--designers and technologists. The second task is to fill out the machine tool park of the machine shop, and to install hoisting mechanisms. As a result of a basic change in the types and sizes of machines being produced, the machine tool park has ceased to conform to its assigned production tasks in respect to the capacities and types of machine tools. There is thus a definite need for very extensive cooperation.

The plant has a surplus of small machine tools, and a definite lack of large, high-power machines. The gear shapers, for instance, have only a 9-percent work load. At the same time, however, a large quantity of gears must be sent elsewhere for machining, sometimes thousands of kilometers from Moscow. Gear-milling and gear-cutting machine tools are only 23 percent utilized, yet all gear wheels must be sent to the Kiev Bol'shevik Plant or to Tekstil'mash in Ivanovo for machining.

This year for the first time, the plant has had to deal with heavy parts weighing up to 9 tons; but Steklomashina's heaviest crane has a maximum lifting capacity of 5 tons. It is easy to understand the complications confronting the assemblers in maneuvering these heavy parts.

The third problem to be solved in connection with the 1951 plan is concerned with assembly space. It is true that Steklomashina was constructed to produce precise and complex, but small-size machines, but next year it must produce a number

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of huge mechanisms which, when assembled, are too large for the area in the assembly shop. To assemble them in sections and send them to the purchasers without proper testing is a dangerous policy in general, but would be even more dangerous under the conditions which exist at the Stekhomashina Plant. The question of expanding assembly space has been placed before the ministry repeatedly by the plant, but it has not yet been solved.

We trust that Glavtekstil'mash and the ministry will devote more attention to this enterprise.

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